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The Supreme Court and the New Family Law: Worklng.
through the Pelech Trilogy*
The trilogy of family law decisions, released by the Supreme Court of Canada
on 4 June 1987,1 represents perhaps the most important statement of the past -
two decades by Canada's highest court on this rapidly changing area of ]aW.2
Although decided under the repealed Divorce Act of 1968,3 judicial analyses
of support and domestic contracts are likely to be little altered under the 1985
Act.' Furthermore, that these cases reveal the Court's underlying philosophy
of the new family law as a whole suggests a sigificance that transcends specific
amendments to the Act.
With respect to the outcome of each individual case, specific pronouncements
of legal doctrine, and the Supreme Court's apparent understanding of the central
features and purposes of the new family law, this comment is largely critical-
of the decisions. In particular, three arguments are made. First, while the Court's
conceptualization of support conforms to the norms of the new family law, the
majority demonstrates insufficient sensitivity to the real barriers to the economic_
independence of spouses disadvantaged by a division of functions within
marriage, and/or enduring consequences of the marriage. Second, the majority's
inadequate inquiry into the application of contract law principles to the family
context and its related failure to distinguish clearly between the separate subjects
of support and domestic contracts at issue in each case contribute to its -
formulation of a confused and inappropriate test to govern the exercise of judicial
* I am greatly indebted to Carol Rogerson, whose valuable comments upon earlier drafts and
reference to various sources helped shape the final form of this paper, and to Kathleen Galli-
van for numerous discussions, in which particular issues were recognized and clarified.
I. Pelech v. Pelech (1987), [1987] 1 S.C.R 801,38 D.L.R. (4th) 642 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter
Pelech]; Richardson v. Richardson (1987), [1987] 1 S.C.R 857, 38 D.L.R. (4th) 699 (S.C.C.)
[hereinafter Richardson]; Caron v, Caron(1987), [1987] 1 S.C.R. 892, 38 D.L.R (4th) 735
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter Caron]. For convenience and in light of the leading character of the
Pelech decision, I refer throughout to the decisions collectively as the Pelech trilogy.
2. The only cases of comparable significance are the series on the use of trust doctrine in family
law: Rathwell v. Rathwell, [1978] 2 S.C.R 436, 1 RF.L. (2d) 1; Pettkus v. Becker, [1980] 2
S.C.R. 834, 19 R.F.L. (2d) 165; Sorochan v. Sorochan, [1986] 2 S.C.R 38,2 RF.L. (3d) 225.
Nevertheless, their significance has been greatly overshadowed by provincial legislative action
in the area of property division on marriage breakdown.
3. RS.C. 1970, c. D-8 [hereinafter DA (1968)]. Repealed by Divorce Ac~ 1985, S.C. 1986, c. 4, s,
32 [hereinafter DA (1985)].
4. This is particularly so because the Court had before it as a guide to determining these cases
the clear expression of public policy on these issues embodied in the 1985 Divorce Act.On
the continued relevance of the case law under the 1968 Divorce Act to the current Act, see
Fyffe v. Fyffe (1986), 4 R.F.L. (3d) 215 (Ont. H.C.). See also Berend Hovius, Family Law:
Cases. Notes and Materials, 2d ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1987) at 502 [hereinafter Hovius].
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discretionunder the Divorce Act to overlook the terms of a domestic agreement.
Third, leaving aside this highly problematic test.. the Court's general posture
of considerable deference to the terms of such agreements is neither required
· underthe Act nor consistent with the central principles animating the new family
· Jaw. An alternative approach to this exercise of the Court's jurisdiction is then
advanced. Finally, this comment considers the implications of the decisions for
.. future cases involving domestic contracts.
: Facts
" Of the three, the leading case is Pelech. The parties had divorced in 1969, at
· which time the registrar approved a maintenance agreement providing for
l $28760 over thirteen months "in full satisfaction" of the wife's claim for
: support.s Fifteen years later, with the ex-husband's net worth at $1.8 million,
· Mrs Pelech - who suffered from "ongoing physical and emotional problems"6
andwas then living at the poverty level - applied for a variation of the original
award,"
In Richardson, the spouses separated in 1979 after twelve years of marriage,
during which Mrs Richardson had worked as a clerk-typist until the birth of
her second child in 1974 and only twice of "very short duration"8 thereafter.
A settlement agreement drafted in 1980 granted each spouse custody of one
child and - apart from a modest property division - provided that the husband
· was to pay spousal support of $175/month for one year and child support of
r $300/month with no limit as to duration. By the time of the divorce action
~ in 1983, during which the wife claimed maintenance for herself and increased
· maintenance for the child,? the wife was receiving social assistance.
Caron dealt with a separation agreement, incorporated into the parties' divorce
decree of 1980, which provided, interalia, for the ex-wife to receive $600/month
spousal support "until such time as she shall remarry or cohabit as man and
wife with any person for a continuous period in excess of ninety (90) days"!"
When the respondent ceased payments following Mrs Caron's cohabitation with
a man in violation of the agreement and, after this second relationship broke
~!------------------------------I 5. It is a curious and unexplained aspect of the case that this agreement followed a ruling by the
British Columbia Supreme Court, which awarded permanent maintenance to the wife and
"referred the case to the Registrar for recommendations in this regard" (Pelech, supra,note 1
at 644).
6. Pelech v. Pelech (1984), 41 R.F.L. 274 at 279 (B.C. S.C.) [hereinafter Pelech (1984)].
7. The application was made with reference to s. 11(2) of the DA (1968).
8. Richardson, supra,note 1 at 702.
9. The application was made with reference to s. l1(l)(a) of the DA (1968).
10. Caron, supra,note 1 at 737.
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down, the ex-wife applied in 1984 for a resumption of maintenance payments.1I
At the time of the application, the thirty-eight-year-old woman was in custody
of an eleven-year-old daughter and had come to rely on public assistance.
Two features of these fact situations deserve particular attention. First,
although Pelech represents a somewhat extreme example, the story the cases
tell is far from atypical. Available data reveal a clear pattern in which marriage
breakdown consistently results in an improved standard of living for men and _
represents an economic disaster for women. Based on the experience of California
families eight years after the introduction of no-fault divorce in that jurisdiction,
Lenore Weitzman discovered that, on average, a woman suffers a seventy-three
per cent decline in her standard of living in the first year after divorce, while
her former husband experiences a forty-two per cent improvement.P Closer
to home, a recent report of the National Council of Welfare estimates that one-
third of women in Alberta are on social assistance "solely because of marriage .
breakdownr.P It is important to keep this social context in mind while
considering the cases.
The second notable characteristic of the trilogy is that, in each case, two legal
issues are intertwined: one dealing with the principles governing spousal support,
the other with the manner in which the courts should approach domestic
agreements determining the rights and obligations of each spouse on marriage
breakdown.P This peculiarity represents a complicating element to analysis of
the cases and to their resolution by the Court. In an effort to avoid the confusion
that beset the Court in this respect, each subject is examined in turn.
11. The application was made with reference to s. 11(2) of the DA (1968).
12. Lenore Weitzman, "The Economics of Divorce" (198011981) 28 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. at 125l.
See also Lenore Weitzman, The Divorce Revolution: The Unexpected Socialand Economic
Consequences for Women and Children in America (London: Collier-Macmillan, 1985). These
results, for Weitzman, were entirely unexpected. On entering into this research, she assumed
that the California experiment with no-fault divorce: "could only have positive results [but
she discovered that] these modem and enlightened reforms have had unanticipated, unin-
tended, and unfortunate consequences. [In particular,] gender-neutral rules - rules designed
to treat men and women 'equally' - have in practice served to deprive divorced women
(especially older homemakers and mothers of young children) of the legal and financial pro-
tections that the old law provided. Instead of recognition for their contributions as homemak-:
ers and mothers, and instead of compensation for the years of lost opportunities and impaired
earning capacities, these women now face a divorce law that treats them 'equally' and
expects them to be equally capable of supporting themselves after divorce" (at xi).
13. National Council of Welfare, Welfare in Canada: The Tangled Safety Net (Ottawa: Ministry of
Supply and Services, November 1987) at 9.
14. In fact, the Court in Carondealt only incidentally with the issue of support, concerning itself
instead with the disputed clause in the parties' separation agreement As a result, this case is
examined below only in the section on domestic agreements: infra,notes 128-133 and
accompanying text
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Support and the New FamilyLaw
Traditionally, alimony was a right, rooted in the wife's status and triggered by
the conduct of the parties. Maintenance was available to wives at common law
or under provincial legislation'> only where the husband was guilty of mat-
rimonial misconduct in the form of adultery, cruelty, or desertion and the wife
was blameless. As long as she continued to lead a faultless life, the husband's
obligation endured-"
The 1968 Divorce Actsignalled a new approach, introducing a regime of formal
juridical equality by recognizing the eligibility of husbands to corollary relief,17
and liberating the marital relationship itself from state regulation through the
introduction of a form of no-fault divorce.P Since state enforcement of marriage
as a lifetime commitment has eroded, increasing emphasis has been placed on
the desirability of securing, where possible, a speedy termination of all relations
between former spouses. This "clean break" philosophy has informed provincial
schemes for equal property division 19 and a general shift in the focus of family
law during the past two decades from the content of the marriage to the
consequences of its breakdown.
The transformation of family law during this period has required a complete
rethinking of the grounds for support. With equality has come a philosophy
of individual responsibility. Nevertheless, while provincial legislation obliges
each spouse to provide for his or her own support and "for the other spouse,
in accordance with need, to the extent that he or she is capable of doing so",2°
the 1968 Divorce Act itself articulated no specific rationale, stipulating only that
the court could make such orders "if it thinks fit and just to do so having regard
to the conduct of the parties and the condition, means and other circumstances
of each of them"."
The absence of any principled basis in the Act for continuing support
obligations after divorce was singled out for particular criticism by the Law
Reform Commission of Canada in its 1975 working paper on Maintenance on
15. Deserted Wives'and Children's Maintenance Act, RS.O. 1970, c. 128; Matrimonial Causes Act,
RS.O. 1970, c. 265.
16. See Christine Davies, "Principles Involved in the Awarding of Spousal Support" (1985) 46
R.F.L. (2d) 210 at 210-211.
17. DA (1968), s. H(l)(b).
18. Ibid. s. 4(1)(e). The Act nevertheless retained as well the traditional grounds of misconduct
ibid. s. 3.
19. See, eg, Family Law ReformAct, RS.O. 1980, c. 152 [hereinafter FLRA]; Family Law Act, S.O.
1986, c. 4 [hereinafter FLA].
20. FLRA, s. 15; FLA, s. 30.
21. DA (1968), s. 11(1); the identical wording appears in s. 11(2), dealing with variation.
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Divorce-? Instead, the commission articulated a philosophy, which, it argued,
should be explicitly recognized in legislative reform: .
The purpose of the maintenance obligations on divorce should be to enable a former
spouse who has incurred a financial disability as a result of marriage to become
'-~"
self-sufficient again in the shortest possible time. This should be achieved through
new rules for financial provision in the Divorce Act that would be based on need
and that are neither punitive nor fault-oriented.P
Within this framework, marriage itself creates no rights to maintenance, which
stem instead from "reasonable needs" arising from the marriage.>' In addition
support is rehabilitative in nature: lasting only during "the transition period
between the end of the marriage and the time when the maintained spouse should
reasonably be expected to assume responsibility for his or her own mainte-
nance".25
Despite the commission report, for the ten years that ensued before parliament
finally enacted the 1985 Divorce Act, the law of support remained, in the words
of Judge Rosalie Abella: "a patchwork of often conflicting theories and
approaches [resembling] a Rubik's cube for which no one yet has written the
Solution Book".26 Contrary to the commission's recommendations, courts
continued to award support in the absence of a causal connection between the
22. Law Reform Commission of Canada, Maintenance on Divorce: Working Paper12 (1975), in
Hovius, supra, note 4 at 344.
23. Ibid.
24. The working paper also allowed two exceptions to this general principle: where "physical or
mental disability" impairs the ability of either spouse to support himself or herself, and where
a spouse is unable to obtain gainful employment (ibid.at 345).
25. Ibid.The economic concept of moral hazard suggests that temporary orders should nonnally
be the rule, to discourage "malingering" and to encourage efforts at rehabilitation. Neverthe-
less, the commission recognized that in some cases, "considering the age of the spouses, the
duration of the marriage, the nature of the needs of the maintained spouse and the origins of
those needs, it would be unreasonableto require the maintained spouse ever to assume
responsibility for his or her own maintenance, and it would not be unreasonable to require the
other spouse to continue to bear this responsibility". .
26. Rosalie S. Abella, "Economic Adjustment on Marriage Breakdown: Support" (1981) 4.Fam.
L. Rev. 1.
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recipient's needs and the marriage.i? So too did courts differ widely in assessing
reasonable needs and prospects for economic rehabilitation.P
The Supreme Court decision in Messier v. Delage'? did little to resolve the
confusion. In a 4-3 judgment, the Court rejected the ex-husband's application
to terminate spousal maintenance in spite ofthe fact that the ex-wife was thirty-
eight years old, had completed a Master's program in translation, had obtained
part-time employment, and was no longer required to remain at home to care
for the children of the marriage. Writing for the minority, Lamer 1. concluded
that the husband's obligations had been discharged, reasoning that the "evolution
of society and the status of women" required former wives to accept "respon-
sibility for their own upkeep",'? so that maintenance should last only "for so
long as it takes to acquire sufficient independence'P! Although the majority
accepted the principle that "the obligation of support between ex-spouses should
[not] continue indefinitely when the marriage bond is dissolved", it deliberately
refrained from enunciating any general principles to govern the Court's decision
- arguing that the Divorce Act established "an intentional flexibility"32 and
that "each case is sui generis" to be decided in accordance with the factors
mentioned in the Act: namely, the parties' conduct, condition,means, and other
circumstances.P What is more, by failing to explain why the husband's
application should be rejected, the majority lent credence to the traditional view
of maintenance as "lifetime security for wives in need who are unable to support
themselves and who were fortunate enough to marry men of ample means'V"
27. Grimev. Grime(1980), 16 RF.L. (2d) 365; 3 Fam. L. Rev. 75 (Ont. H.C.). See also Newson v.
Newson(1986), 2 R.F.L. (3d) 137 (B.C. C.A.), where Anderson I.A. declared: "it is not neces-
sary in order to succeed in a claim for maintenance to show that one's need was caused by
the marriage" (at 159).
28. Thus, for example, while the Ontario Court of Appeal in Lashley v. Lashley (1985), 47 R.F.L.
(2d) 371 (Ont. C.A.), restricted support to five years where the ex-wife had a Grade XI edu-
cation and custody of three young children, noting that "the wife is young [and] there is no
reason why she should not be able to so arrange her life that she will be in a position to earn
an income and maintain herself within the five-year period" (at 372), the Saskatchewan
Court of Queen's Bench, in Richardsv. Richards(1985), 45 Sask. R. 55 (Sask. Q.B.,V.F.C.),
awarded spousal support to enable the wife to care for her child full time despite her youth
and the short duration of the marriage - because she had been put in "a position of want"
caused by the "joint decision" that the wife give up her job and have a baby (at 58).
29. (1983),35 RF.L. (2d) 337, [1983] 2 S.C.R 401.
30. Ibid. at 356.
31. Ibid. at 363.
32. Ibid. at 344.
33. Ibid. at 350.
34. Berend Hovius, "Case Comment: Messierv. Delage", in Hovius, supra,note 4 at 397. In the
final analysis, Hovius maintains (at 390) that the majority decision turned mainly on a mis-
taken characterization of the trial court's order as one of limited-term maintenance rather
than termination.
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This traditional view is reflected in the trial decisions in Pelech and Richardson.
In the former, Wong L.J.S.C.ordered payments of $2000/month, explaining that
"the only reason maintenance has been permitted to revive now is because the
wife has dire need and the husband has ample means to provide"." In the latter
Perras L.J.S.C. (Ont.) cited the "present handicaps experienced by Mrs. Richard~
son" as sufficient reason to restore spousal support and increase it to $500'
month."
By the time these cases reached the Supreme Court of Canada, however,
parliament had enacted the 1985 Divorce Act, giving statutory recognition to
the principles of individual responsibility articulated ten years earlier by the
Law Reform Commission of Canada and subsequently by the minority in
Messier.37 That support was denied in Pelech, Richardson, and Caron is testimony
to the significance of this clear statement of public policy. Therefore, Wilson
J. (Dickson C.J.c., McIntyre, Lamer, and LeDain JJ. concurring) writes in Pelech
that, although
Mrs. Pelech's hardship is great, to burden the respondent with her care fifteen
years after their marriage has ended for no other reason than that they were once
husband and wife [creates] a fiction of marital responsibility at the expense of
individual responsibility."
Spousal support, therefore, is justified on the basis of rehabilitation rather than
retribution, is conditioned on reasonable needs arising from a division of
functions in the marriage, and is normally of temporary duration. In the words
of Wilson J., once independence has been attained, "a former spouse who simply
falls upon hard times ... should not be able to fall back on the former spouse,
no matter how radical the change may be, simply because they were husband
and wife".39 Rather, the imposition of responsibility for changed circumstances
35. Pelech (1984), supra, note 6 at 285.
36. Unreported decision, cited in Richardson, supra,note 1 at 703.
37. According to the Act, support should: U(a)recognize any economic advantages or disadvan-
tages to the spouses arising from the marriage or its breakdown; (b) apportion between the
spouses any financial consequences arising from the care of any child of the marriage over
and above the obligation apportioned between the spouses pursuant to sub-section (8) [child
support]; (c) relieve any economic hardship of the spouses arising from the breakdown of the
marriage; and (d) in so far as practicable, promote the economic self-sufficiency of each
spouse within a reasonable time" (DA (1985), s. 15(7)). Identical factors are to be taken into
consideration in respect of variation: ibid. s. 17(7). Furthermore, although the Act retains the
fault grounds of adultery and physical or mental cruelty (ibid. s. 8(2)(b)), it stipulates that
misconduct is not to be taken into consideration in an application for support or variation:
ibid. s-ss. 15(6), 17(6).
38. Pelech, supra,note 1 at 678.
39. Ibid. at 677.
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on the former spouse requires "that there be some relationship between the
change and the marriage'V?
This formulation surely accords with the norms of equality and individual
responsibility refected in the new family law. What remains problematic in the
Court's approach is the manner in which it conceptualizes the causal nexus
between current circumstances and a division of functions within the marriage
and the requirements of and possibilities for economic rehabilitation.
In Pelech, for example, although the wife had largely withdrawn from the
labour market from the time of her marriage in 1954 at age twenty-three until
the divorce in 1969 - merely assisting her husband in his contracting business
as a receptionist and bookkeeper - the Court found "no link" between her
poverty and the marriage." While a more sensitive interpretation might suggest
that support payments were inadequate for purposes of rehabilitation, the Court
attributes her inability to care for herself to "psychological problems which ...
pre-dated the marriage'V? In fact, although the trial judge did reject the
submission that Mrs Pelech's physical and emotional problems stemmed from
the husband's physical or mental cruelty, there appears to have been no evidence
before the Court that these problems actually pre-datedthe marriage.P Regard-
less, it is arguable that, since the law expects the first resort of the married
person in financial need to be his or her spouse rather than public assistance
(excluding assistance, such as unemployment insurance, for which the spouse
has paid), a similar obligation should survive the dissolution of the partnership
for a reasonable period of time.44 The Court, however, did not consider this
point directly. Therefore, although it obviously decided that Mr Pelech's
obligations to his former wife had been discharged, the lack of explicit
justification for this conclusion - and the evidentiary basis on which it rests
- render it highly problematic.
Similarly, in Richardson, the Court - with the sole exception of LaForest
1. (dissenting) - betrays an insensitivity to the real barriers to the economic
rehabilitation of women who for some time have been out of the job market
(or participating in a manner subsidiary to a domestic role) or are burdened
40. Ibid. at 676.
41. Ibid. at 678.
42. Ibid.
43. See Pelech (1984), supra,note 6 at 277-280.
44. This point is made by the Law Reform Commission of Canada in its 1975 report and is the
rationale behind the commission's stated exceptions to individual responsibility for mainte-
nance where "physical or mental disability'[ impairs the ability of either spouse to maintain
himself or herself, and where a spouse is unable to obtain gainful employment (Law Reform
Commission of Canada, Maintenance on Divorce (1975), supra,note 4 at 345, 347). This
issue has resurfaced in post-Pelech decisions, with the courts adopting widely divergent posi-
tions. See Cristin Schmitz, "Cases clash over linking support need to marriage", The Lawyer's
Weekly (15 January 1988) at 1.
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with the care of young children from the marriage. Although Mrs Richardson
worked during the early years of the marriage, her withdrawal from the labour
market on the birth of her second child confirms that her career took second
place to that of the husband - who, by the time of divorce proceedings in
1983, had attained the rank of sergeant with the Ottawa police force. Never- .
theless, Wilson J. (Dickson C.J.c., McIntyre, Lamer, and LeDain 11. concurring)
rejects the argument that "the marriage atrophied her skills and impaired their
marketability'v'" Furthermore, although Mrs Richardson had custody of one of
the children of the marriage and was receiving social assistance at the time
of the divorce, the majority concludes that "[n]o event has occurred which the
appellant is peculiarly unable to deal' with because of a pattern of economic
dependency generated by the marriage't."
In the end, therefore, while the Court's emphasis on individual responsibilije
and finality in relations between ex-spouses represents a progressive develop-
ment, in accordance with principles of gender equality embedded in the new
family law, the specific decisions at which the majority arrives in Pelech and
Richardson reveal a failure to examine carefully the practical impediments to
financial independence confronting each appellant.f" As a result, the Supreme
Court has established an unfortunate example to guide the decisions of lower
courts.
On the other hand, two factors suggest caution against overstating the
implications of the Pelech trilogy when it comes to the law of support. First,
the specific findings in each case are determined less by broad legal principles
of individual responsibility than by factual matters regarding the degree of
economic dependency engendered by the marriage. Lower courts are free to
arrive at different conclusions of fact involving a more sympathetic reading
as to the real barriers to an ex-spouse's economic rehabilitation. Second, and
45. Richardson, supra,note 1 at 706. In contrast, LaForest 1. concludes that not only would Mrs
Richardson's skills have atrophied during the years that she remained at home with the chil-
dren, but that "she would not have been able to gain the new skills that are so necessary
today in her field as well as in others" (at 720).
46. Ibid. at 705. Again, LaForest 1. displays a refreshing sense of realism here, pointing out that
"Mrs. Richardson is now in her mid-forties and must find time and energy to care for a child,
factors that are by no means negligible in asserting her competitive position as against
younger people with recent training" (at 720).
47. In contrast, JUdge Rosalie Abella has cautioned (extra-judicially) that the courts "must be
wary, in attempting to encourage speedy economic recovery and financial independence,
about finite support orders that bear no relationship to a spouse's history", observing that "It
is hard to be an independent equal when one is not equally able to become independent
Independence will not be possible for everyone; it should therefore not be used, as it has
sometimes been, prematurely. It should not be used, in other words, where the realities of the
marketplace and community combine to make it impractical. The pattern of a given mar-
riage is critical to the possibility of independence" (Abella, "Opening Address" (1985), in
Hovius supra,note 4 at 8).
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of greater significance, is the fact that each case involves not only issues of
support, but also questions as to the mflnner in which a court should approach
the terms of a domestic agreement. Reliance cannot, therefore, be placed on
one branch of the decisions without examining the other as well.48 It is to the
latter task that this comment now turns.
Domestic Agreements and the New Family Law
The transformation of spousal support over the past two decades reflects a more
general emphasis within the new family law on individual responsibility and
individual rights. Conjointly, the law has recognized the freedom of cohabitees
to determine the content of their own relationship and to make their own
arrangements in settlement of financial matters on the breakdown of their
relationship. In this respect, it has been suggested, the law appears to have
abandoned the traditional vision of the family as an organic unity, in favour
of a conception of cohabitation relationships analogous to contracts.s? Given
this characterization, it would be surprisingnot to observe a change in the manner
in which the courts have approached domestic contracts.
As late as 1919, the English Court of Appeal refused to enforce a separation
agreement on the ground that settlements of this sort "are not contracts because
the parties did not intend that they should be attended by legal consequences'V"
With respect to such promises, the Court held that: "each house is a domain
into which the King's writ does not seek to run and to which his officers do
. not seek to be admitted'V" Similarly, the courts denied spouses the right to
opt out of the legally determined incidents of marriage and divorce. In Hyman
v. Hymanf? for example, the House of Lords set aside the wife's waiver of legal
rights on the grounds that:
[T]he power ofthe court to make provision for a wife on dissolution of her marriage
is a necessary incident of the power to decree such a dissolution, conferred not
48. In fact, the post-Pelech decision in Smith v. Smith (unreported) would restrict Pelech only to
those cases in which the parties have settled their affairs by private agreement. The courts in
Winterle v. Winterle (1987), 10 R.F.L. (3d) 129 (Ont, S.C.) and in Fisher v. Fisher (unreported),
on the other hand, have read into the decisions more direct statements on the law of support.
See Schmitz, supra,note 44.
49. See, eg, Mary Ann Glendon, The New Family and the New Property (Toronto: Butterworth,
1981). Glendon invokes Sir Henry Maine's often-quoted observation that "the movement of
the progressive societies has hitherto been a movement from Statusto Contract" (at 42). For a
critical analysis of this interpretation, see Martha Minow, "'Forming Underneath Everything
that Grows': Toward a History of Family Law" [1985] Wise. L. Rev. 819.
50. Balfourv. Balfour, [1919], 2 K.B. 571 at 579 (C.A.),per Atkin U.
51. Ibid.
52. [1929] A.C. 601 (H.L.) [hereinafter Hyman].
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merely in the interests of the wife, but of the public.... [Therefore] the wife
cannot by her own covenant preclude herself from invoking the jurisdiction of
the Court or preclude the Court from the exercise of that jurisdiction.v
As might be expected, more recent authority is substantially more deferential .
to the consensual arrangements entered into by both spouses on marriag~'
breakdown.>' In Farquarv. Farquars" for example, the Ontario Court of Appeal
enumerated several reasons for the courts to uphold the terms of a maintenance
agreement.w First, it concluded, settlement is desirable both because the parties
are likely to be happier with their own solutions than with those imposed by
the courts and because it relieves the courts of the burden of resolving disputes.sr
Second, settlement can be encouraged only if the parties to an agreement can
expect it to be binding and recognized by the courts." Third, parties need to
be able to rely on such agreements as final, if they are to plan their future
affairs.t? Finally, since property and spousal maintenance matters are "inex-
tricably intertwined" in most settlements, it would ordinarily be unfair to reopen
the issue of maintenance, while allowing the settlement of property issues to
stand.s? .
These objectives - efficiency, certainty, finality, and fairness- are consistent.
with the norm of individual responsibility and with the "clean break" philosophy
of the new family law and are worthy in their own right. On the other hand,
where - as is likely to be the case in the context of domestic contractse! -
imperfect information and disparate bargaining power characterize the nego-
tiation of these agreements, neither efficiency nor fairness are served by a strict
adherence to contractual provisions. Rather, the pursuit of these two objectives
may require the court to grant relief from harsh terms. In this situation, therefore,
the goals of predictability and finality conflict with those of efficiency and
fairness. To uphold "freedom of contract" as the primary legal value is thus
to make an implicit policy choice favouring the former over the latter - an
53. Ibid. at 614, per Lord Hailsham L.C.
54. The freedom of cohabitees to make their own financial arrangements in the event of the ter-
mination of their relationship is expressly recognized in provincial statutes enacted in the
1970s and 1980s. Both the FLRA and the FLA allow domestic contracts to prevail where in
conflict with the Act except where the Act provides otherwise: FLRA, s. 2(9); FLA, s. 2(10).
55. (1983), 1 D.L.R. (4th) 244 (Ont, C.A.) [hereinafter Farquar].
56. See also DalSanto v. DalSanto (1975), 21 R.F.L. 117 (B.C. S.C.), commenting on "the impor-
tance not only to the parties but to the community as a whole that contracts of this kind
should not be lightly disturbed" (at 120); and Harrington v. Harrington (1981), 22 R.F.L. (2d)
40 (Ont, CA.): agreements not to be "lightly disregarded".
57. Farquar, supra,note 55 at 251.
58. Ibid.
59. Ibid.
60. Ibid. at 252.
61. See infra, notes 113-114, 122-125 and their accompanying text
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approach that, while characteristic of nineteenth-century contract law, is not
immediately obvious today.62
Furthermore, given the absence of any express mention of separation
agreements in the 1968 Divorce Act and, in light of the stipulation in the 1985
Divorce Act that a support order shall merely "take into consideration . . . [an]
agreement or arrangement relating to support of the spouse or child",63 it is
clear that the judge retains ultimate jurisdiction to overlook the terms of such
agreements where, in the words of the 1968 Act, he or she considers this "fit
and just".64 Consequently, the court must determine the manner in which this
authority ought to be exercised.s"
In resolving this question, three points should be taken into account. First,
discretion ought not to be left to each individual judge's intuitive sense ofjusticess
but should instead be structured in some principled manner.s?The latter approach
not only reduces the incentives to litigate under an uncertain set of criteria but
diminishes arbitrariness and, thereby, furthers equality before the law. Second,
the factors structuring the exercise of this discretion to overlook the terms of
a domestic agreement must be distinguished from those operative in contract
law as a whole. Even the most cursory review of this area of the law reveals
the existence of numerous doctrines, specific to the law of contracts, which
operate to excuse contractual non-performance.s" mistake as to contractual
62. See S.M. Waddams, The Law ofContract, 2d ed. (Toronto: Canada Law Book, 1984) at 3.
63. DA (1985), s. 15(5)(c) [emphasis added].
64. LaForest 1. (dissenting) writes in Richardson: "the discretion to award maintenance is vested
in the judge in the divorce action, not anyone else. The parties, therefore, cannot oust his or
her jurisdiction by contract" (at 711). Similarly, Wilson J. determines in Pelech that "the
court's supervisory jurisdiction over maintenance cannot be extinguished by contract" (at
663).
65. Wilson J. writes in Pelech: "The question thus becomes the nature and extent of the constraint
imposed on the courts by the presence of an agreement which was intended by the parties to
settle their affairs in a final and conclusive manner" (at 675-676).
66. This approach, one can recall, had dominated the law of support under the 1968 Divorce Act
(reaching its apogee in the majority decision in Messier) but was decisively rejected by the
Court in Pelech (supra, notes 20-40 and accompanying text).
67. See, generally, Kenneth C. Davis, Discretionary Justice: A Preliminary Inquiry(Baton Rouge:
Louisiana State University Press, 1969). In his "Annotation" to Webb v. Webb (1984), 39
R.F.L. (2d) 113 (Ont. C.A.) [hereinafter Webb], McLeod remarks that "to be a proper judicial
act," the exercise of judicial discretion "must be subject to discretion structuring factors
which set out the relevant discretion factors and the weight to be accorded them" (at 114).
68. See, generally, Waddams, supra,note 62.
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terms, mistake in assumptions, misrepresentation.s? unconscionabiliryjo and
public policy generally. If parliament's apparent bestowal ofadditional discretion
under the Divorce Act is to mean anything, therefore, surely it requires something
more than mere scrutiny on the basis of already applicable contract doctrine.
On the contrary, and third, the principles structuring the specifically statutory
exercise of judicial discret~on should find their origin i.n those valu~s infOrming
the Act and the new family law generally." Only this approach IS consistent
with the legitimate role of an unelected judiciary.
While some recognition of these factors (or, more often, recognition of some
of these factors) is apparent in recent decisions involving domestic agreements
much of the caselaw in this area is unclear.P The Pelech trilogy, unfortunately:
reproduces this confusion.
In Farquar, as noted, the Ontario Court of Appeal favoured a policy of
considerable deference to the terms of a domestic agreement. On the other hand,
Zuber lA. wrote for a unanimous Court: "since the settlement is a contract,
all of the common law and equitable defences to the enforcement of ordinary
contracts are available to the spouse or ex-spouse who seeks to avoid the'
69. See Lamersv. Lamers(1978),6 RF.L. (2d) 283 (Ont. S.C.); Hood v. Hood (1981), 4 F.L.R.R
81 (Ont SC); Couzens v. Couzens (1981), 24 RF.L. (2d) 243 (Ont. C.A.). In each of these
cases, moreover, the Court also required full disclosure of assets in the negotiation of a
domestic agreement, in recognition of a fiduciary relationship between the parties. Indeed,
the FLA recognizes this special duty, providing in s. 56(4)(a) that a court may set aside a
domestic contract or a provision in it: "if a party failed to disclose to the other significant
assets, or significant debts or other liabilities, existing when the domestic contract was
made". The Court in Farquar, on the other hand, rejected this approach.
70. See Mundinger v. Mundinger (1968),3 DLR. (3d) 338 (Ont. C.A.), aff'd 1~ D.L.R (3d) 256
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter Mundinger]; Trottier v. Altobelli(1983), 36 RFL (2d) 199 (Ont. C.A.);
Redlv. Redl(1983),35 R.F.L. (2d) 117 (Ont. RC.); Richiev. Richie, (1980), 19 RF.L. (2d) 199
(Ont, RC.) [hereinafter Richie]. The FLA permits the court to set aside private arrangements
regarding support "in accordance with the law of contract" (s. 56(4)(c», where they result
in"unconscionable circumstances" (s. 33(4)(a», or "if a party did not understand the nature
or consequences of a domestic contract" (s. 56(4)(b». Nonetheless, more recent decisions
have demonstrated considerably less paternalism than characterized previous decisions such
as Mundinger, emphasizing instead the advantages of settlement and the public policy of
encouraging parties to bargain seriously. See Salonenv. Salonen(1986), 2 RF.L. (3d) 273
(Ont. U.F.C.).
71. Integrity, writes Dworkin, requires the "Herculean" judge "to construct, for each statute he
[or she] is asked to enforce, some justification that fits and flows through the statute and is,if
possible, consistent with other legislation in force" (Ronald Dworkin, Law sEmpire (Cam-
bridge, Mass.: Belknap, 1986) at 338). See also Owen Fiss, "The Death of the Law?" (1986)
72 Cornell L. Rev. 1. In a similar interpretivist vein, McLeod [supra, note 67] comments that
as "an exercise of legal power" judicial discretion "must reflect the dominant societal views
if it is to operate as an effective vehicle of social regulation. Just as society changes, so dis-
cretion structuring factors must change in nature and weight to reflect societal aims" (at 1.15),
His subsequent conclusion that the objective of encouraging settlement requires this exercise
of discretion to "protect the settlement reached", on the other hand, need not (and, it is
argued below, should not) follow from these principles.
72. See infra, notes 73-81 and 93-94 and their accompanying text.
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agreement"." The application of these defences, he continued, was to be carefully
distinguished from a "narrow range of cases" in which relief is available in
spite of the existence of an otherwise valid agreement." Nevertheless, Zuber
lA. found it unnecessary further to identify this "narrow range".75
It was for Blair lA., in a subsequent case before the Ontario Court of Appeal,"
to attempt to put some structure on this discretion. His approach, however, was
not - as outlined above - one of principle but, instead, the identification of
situations "clearly accepted" by past courts "as justifying a departure from the
terms of a separation agreement","? Specifically, he noted three such circum-
stances: where the failure to provide support is likely to result in one spouse
becoming a public charge," where the maintenance agreement contains
inadequate provisions for children." and where the contract is unconscionable
because of "circumstances surrounding its execution'U?
These remarks should have been approached with considerable caution. To
begin with, any method of judicial decision-making that merely catalogues the
previous decisions of other courts is liable to reproduce their errors. More
seriously, in attempting to define Zuber lA.'s "narrow range", Blair l.A. blurs
the distinction that his brother judge had begun to draw between "all of the
common law and equitable defences to the enforcement of ordinary contracts"
and the exercise of a specific statutory discretion to overlook the terms of a
domestic agreement." Unconscionability, in particular, surely falls within the
former rather than the latter category.
73. Farquar,supra, note 55 at 252.
74. Ibid.
75. Ibid.
76. Webb, supra, note 67.
77. Ibid. at 133.
78. Ibid. See, eg, the dicta of Atkin LJ. in Hyman supra, note 52 at 628-629. In Canada, the
leading case is Fabian v. Fabian (1983), 34 R.F.L. (2d) 313 (Ont CA), where Lacourciere
I.A. refers to the "interest of the public" declaring that: "A spouse's primary obligation and
duty of maintenance should be enforced when necessary to prevent the other spouse from
having or continuing to receive public support" (at 316). Similarly, s. 33(4)(b) of the FLA
allows the court "to set aside a provision for support or a waiver of the right to support in a
domestic contract ... if the provision for support is in favour of or the waiver is by or on
behalf of a dependent who qualifies for an allowance for support out of public money." A
similar rationale was expressed in Pelech by the trial judge, who stated that: "The burden of
maintaining the wife under these circumstances should not be shifted to the public purse" (at
285).
79. Webb,supra, note 67 at 133-134. See lull v. lull (1984),42 R.FL (2d) 113 (Alta. C.A.); Binns
v. Binns (1985), 45 R.F.L. (2d) 369 (N.S. Fam. Ct.). The FLA also recognizes this exception to
the sanctity of domestic contracts, stating in s. 56(1) that "the court may disregard any provi-
sion of a domestic contract" with respect to support where "in the opinion of the court, to do
so is in the best interests of the child."
80. Webb, supra, note 67 at 134.
81. The majority decision of Arnup lA. (Weatherston lA. concurring), on the other hand, was
clear on this distinction (ibid. at 125).
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In the Pelech trilogy,however, the Supreme Court appears to accept uncri~cally
Blair lA.'s framework. Thus, it adopts his threefold itemization of the "narrow
range of cases" to which Zuber lA. had referred, replicates and amplifies his
problematic treatment of unconscionability, and disregards Zuber I.A.'s attempt
to distinguish between common law and equitable defences to contractual
enforcement and the court's discretionary jurisdiction under the Divorce Act.
Finally, the Court fails to consider seriously the existence of any basis other
than the' "narrow range of cases" as defined by Blair 1.A. for judicial exercise
of its statutory discretion to overlook the terms of a domestic agreement. Each
of these components of the trilogy is examined below. '
PUBLIC CHARGES AND DEPRIVATION OF CHILDREN
Although it adopts Blair lA.'s catalogue of situations in which relief is available
under the Divorce Act, the Court nevertheless rejects both reliance on public
assistance and indirect deprivation of children as unjustified grounds for departing
from the spousal support provisions of a domestic agreement. The facts of all
three cases involved the former circumstance; the latter situation arose' in
Richardson. With regard to the so-called "principle of saving the public purse",
the Court's reasoning is consistent with the norms of individual responsibility and
the "clean break" philosophy informing the new family law. Absent "a radical
change in circumstances flowing from an economic pattern of dependency
engendered by the marriage," the Court concludes, "the obligation to support the
former spouse should be, as in the case of any other citizen, the communal
responsibility of the state."82 In so far as indirect deprivation to children is
concerned, while recognizing that a spouse cannot barter away the child's right
to support, the Court concludes that the different bases and characteristics of
child and spousal support dictate that "if the court's concern is that the child
is being inadequately provided for, then that concern should be addressed by
varying the amount of child support" rather than increasing the amount of spousal
support.83 In each instance, the Court's arguments are compelling.
82. Pelech, supra, note 1 at 677.
83. Richardson, supra, note 1 at 707. Wilson J. notes several advantages to this approach: "First,
it explicitly identifies the area of the court's concern. Second, the benefit accrues to the indi-
vidual whose legal right it is. The duty to support the child is a duty owed to the child not to
the other parent Third, the traditional characteristics of the child maintenance order better
reflect the court's concern for the child's welfare than do the traditional characteristics of the
spousal maintenance order. For example, while the court could order that a spousal mainte-
nance order would cease when the children are no longer dependent, child maintenance
always ceases when the children are no longer dependent Further, the amount of child sup-
port in child maintenance orders is based on the demonstrated need of the child.'Although'
'increased child support may indirectly benefit the custodial spouse, it will not be based on the
court's assessment of the spouse's need" (at 707 -708).
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UNCONSCIONABILITY AND CONTRACT LAW
The court's treatment of contract law proper, on the other hand, is particularly
disappointing. Although agreeing with Zuber J.A.'s remarks on the continued
availabilityof "all ofthe common law and equitable defenses to the enforcement
of ordinary contracts", Wilson J. appears to identify these excuses for nonper-
formance with the single doctrine of unconscionability. In this, she not only
follows Blair J.A.'s failure to distinguish between relief under principles of
ordinary contract law and the exercise of judicial discretion under the Divorce
Actbut she actually equates Blair 1.A.'s third category within the "narrow range
ofcases" acknowledging relief under the Act with all common law and equitable
defences to contractual enforcement. Having done so, she dismisses the need
for further inquiry into the subject, concluding that:
If the contract is invalid then the question as to whether or not the court should
defer to its terms disappears. Thus, unconscionability in the technical sense . . .
is not properly a part of this discusston.r'
Where a central element in each case involves the appellant's request that
the Court grant relief from the terms of a contract, it is difficult to imagine
:how unconscionability can possibly be excluded a priori from the discussion.
rTheanswer advanced by Wilson J. would appear to be that, because the existence
iof a contract is a question of fact for the trier of first instance and because
[an unconscionable contract ceases to be a contract (so that "the question as
~ towhether or not the court should defer to its terms disappears") if a trial judge
!rules against unconscionability, the question cannot be considered by a higher
foo~ ~I This approach to the law of contracts exhibits a long-abandoned notion that
;defences to contractual enforcement operate only by avoiding the genuine
["meeting of the minds" required for contract formation. For modem doctrine, .
[on the other hand, these defences do not abrogate the contract but rather excuse
1nonperformance of an otherwise enforceable agreement.w Consequently, even
[though the trial judge in Pelech failed to rule that the contract had been
1"vitiated",86 "unconscionability in the technical sense" could not properly be
lexclud~d a priori from discussion by the Court.
• On the other hand, it would appear, the Court was right to deny relief on
the basis of unconscionability in each case of the trilogy. In Pelech, the bargain
had been entered into "freely and on full knowledge and with the advice of
84. Pelech, supra,note 1 at 674-675.
85. See Waddams, supra, note 62.
86. Pelech, supra,note 1 at 668.
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counsel'V? The same conditions applied in Richardsonn and Caron,89 s.0 that
in no case could the agreement be considered "unconscionable in the substantive
law sense".90
FRUSTRATION AND THE PELECH TEST
For Wilson J. all analysis of contract doctrine begins and ends with uncons- -
cionability - since, as has been pointed out,91 she identifies the full, panoply
of common law and equitable defences to contractual enforcement with the
single doctrine of unconscionability. Thus, the Court neglects to consider the
application of any other doctrine excusing nonperformance to the facts of the
Pelech trilogy.92 As a further result, moreover, it misinterprets as judicial
discretion under the Divorce Act the operation of these doctrines in several cases
that it considers.v'
While this is not the place to enter into a detailed discussion of the application
of each such defence to the family law context, of particular importance in
Pelech and Richardson is the doctrine of frustration, well-established in the law
of contract." In the former, according to the trial judge, "the parties contemplated
at the time of the agreement that the wife would be able to obtain gainful
87. Ibid. at 643.
88. See Richardson, supra, note 1 at 709.
89. See Caron, supra, note 1 at 736.
90. Pelech, supra, note 1 at 676; Richardson, supra, note 1 at 709; and Caron, supra, note 1 at
744.
91. Supra, note 84 and accompanying text
92. See supra, notes 68-70 and accompanying text.
93. This is true, for example, of the Court's treatment of Rossv. Ross(1983), 39 R.F.L. (2d) 51
(Man. C.A.) [hereinafter Ross], in which the husband was ordered to pay an additional $18
000 lump sum support in divorce proceedings after he had engaged in threats, pressure and
intimidation to get the wife to agree to an "unfair and unbalanced settlement". Instead of
interpreting this judgment in terms of the contract doctrine of unconscionability, Wilson 1..
groups it together with other decisions of the Manitoba Court of Appeal [Newman v. Newman
(1980),4 Man. R. (2d) 50 (C.A.); Katz v. Katz (1983),33 R.F.L. (2d) 412 (Man. C.A.)] mani-
festing a "paternalistic philosophy" respecting the exercise of judicial discretion under the' .
Divorce Act (at 663). On the other hand, in this interpretation Wilson 1.merely reproduces the
approach of the Manitoba court, which is itself unclear on the distinction emphasized here".,'
94. See Krell v. Henry, [1903] 2 KB. 740 (C.A.). A leading Canadian case on the subject is Capi-'
tal Quality Homes v. Colwyn Construction (1975), 9 OR (2d) 617 (ant C.A.) [hereinafter
Capital Quality Homes]. For an application of this doctrine to the context of a maintenance- -
agreement, see Webb,supra, note 67, in which performance by the husband was excused after
he suffered a large and unforeseeable financial loss. As with Ross, supra, note 93, in whic.h, ;
Wilson J. misinterprets unconscionability as statutory discretion, similarly here, the doctrine
of frustration is misunderstood as a separate test for the exercise of judicial discretion com-.
prising "a middle ground between the Farquar and Rossapproaches" (at 668). .
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employment"95 - a condition that was obviously not realized." In the latter,
LaForest J. (dissenting) considers it a "reasonable inference" that both parties
anticipated at the time of the agreement "that Mrs. Richardson would be able
to find work within the one-year period for which support was provided","?
Since the majority in Richardson rules that the parties' expectations at the time
of the agreement were "unclear";" however, it is only in Pelech that the Court
is forced to address this defence. Here, the treatment by the majority adds to
the confusion.
First, Wilson 1. is quick to point out that, although the trial judge regarded
· Mrs Pelech's impoverishment as a "gross" change in circumstances and held
that the settlement was predicated on the assumption of the ex-wife's employa-
: bility, he "does not expressly find that this vitiates the agreement'Y'? Again,
· this statement betrays a misunderstanding both as to the range of available
defences to the enforcement of ordinary contracts and as to their effect (which
· is not to vitiate the agreement but to excuse nonperformance). While it is true
· that Wong LJ.S.C. refused to fmd the agreement unconscionable "at the time
i the parties entered into it",IOO the fact that he allowed Mrs Pelech's application
~ for variation proves that he did consider the settlement unenforceable: "since
the circumstances of the parties since the signing have so changed as to make
the provision for maintenance contained therein manifestly unfair",'?'
95. Pelech (1984), supra,note 6 at 280.
96. The mere fact that the expectations of contracting parties are not realized is, of course, not
alone grounds for the defence of frustration; otherwise, the law would permit no bargain that
is later revealed to have been bad for either party. Thus, in CapitalQuality Homes, supra,note
94, the Ontario Court of Appeal declared that: "The supervening event must be something
beyond the control of the parties and must result in a significant change in the original obli-
gation assumed by them" (at 623). While the former requirement that the cause of frustration
be "beyond the control of the parties" would appear to pose an insurmountable barrier to an
attempt to apply the doctrine to the support context where an inability to find gainful
employment is generally thought to be within the "control" of the ex-spouse, it is important
to place a liberal interpretation on this term. The essential question, as Wong LJ.S.C. sug-
gests in Pelech (1984), is whether the frustrating circumstances could be fairly attributed to
the ex-spouse herself. In this respect, he is clear that Mrs Pelech is blameless: "She managed
the settlement funds well and did not squander them. She has not been lazy in seeking
employment or to improve herself for such purpose. Despite her efforts, the wife's unstable
emotional and physical health has prevented her from becoming self-supporting, and this sit-
uation will likely continue. The maintenance fund given to her in 1969 has now been
depleted through no fault ofhers"(supra, note 6 at 285) (emphasis added).
97. Richardson, supra,note I at 721.
98. Ibid.
.99. Pelech, supra,note 1 at 668.
100. Pelech (1984), supra,note 6 at 280.
101. Ibid. at 284. Of course, the expression "manifestly unfair" implies a particular standard of
fairness, and - one can recall - the trial judge imports into this standard both notions of
fairness to the public purse and fairness as "lifetime security" that contradict the philosophy
of individual responsibility informing the new family law.
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In any event, Wilson 1. finds more compelling the emphasis on "finality in
the financial affairs of former spouses"102 that Zuber 1.A. expresses in: the
following passage from Farquar.
In my view, changed circumstances, even substantially changed circumstances,
are not a sufficient basis for avoiding the minutes of settlement. It is inevitable
that the circumstances of. the contracting parties will change following the
agreement. If the change of circumstances would allow a party to avoid an othe':Wise
enforceable agreement, then it is apparent that no separation agreement or minutes
of settlement can ever finally resolve anything.' 03
Nevertheless, finding the rule in Farquar somewhat too restrictive, she proceeds
to formulate a separate test, allowing for judicial intervention ill the limited
occurrence in which "there has been a radical change in circumstances related
to a pattern of economic dependency generated by the marriage relationship'n«
That this statement follows a particularly confused treatment of the law of
contract in the context offamily law would suggest, at the very least, considerable
caution in approaching this test. The problems, however, do not end there. On
examination, it is readily apparent that this test is the product of two errors.
First, it transforms a test that applies only to those fact situations in which issues
of frustration arise into a general test "to be applied by the courts in interfering
with the minutes of settlement entered into by former spouses".' os Second, it
confuses the two issues of support and domestic contracts at issue in the Pelech
trilogy. The radical change that excuses performance of a contract is distinct
from the radical change in the fortunes of an ex-spouse that justifies a court
order awarding or varying spousal support. The former addresses the deference
with which a court should approach the terms of a maintenance agreement;
the latter speaks to the principles governing the law of support. While predicating
support on a causal connection between an ex-spouse's financial condition and
a division of functions within the marriage corresponds to the norm of individual
responsibility contained within the new family law, there is simply no reason
for relief to be granted from the terms of a separation agreement only where
"a radical change in circumstances [relates to] a pattern of economic dependency
generated by the marriage". Such a test effectively rewrites the doctrine of
frustration in the context of domestic agreements.
The majority's confusion in this respect is particularly manifest in Richardson,
where it holds that the same test applies to the original order for maintenance
102. Pelech, supra, note 1 at 676.
103. Farquar, supra, note 55 at 283.
104. Caron, supra,note 1 at 738. The original statement of the test appears in Pelech, at 676-677.
105. Ibid, at 738.
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under s-s. 11(1) as is formulated in Pelech with respect to variation under s-s.
11(2). Surely, this cannot be right. As LaForest J. points out in dissent, there
are significant differences between the two types of decision:
When the trial judge exercises an original discretion in a divorce action to make
an order for maintenance where the parties have entered into an agreement, it
comes to the judge for the first time and he or she must review all the circumstances
as a whole in exercising the discretion given by the Divorce Act to do what is
fit and just. When a variation of such an order is sought, however, the judge is
dealing with an order by which it has already been determined under the Act that
the agreement was fit and just. The judge's authority is under the Act then confined
to considering the circumstances that have since intervened. Under these circum-
stances a judge should adopt a far more stringent attitude before disturbing the
agreement incorporated into a maintenance order.106
Thus, where an application is made to vary spousal support established under
a maintenance agreement and subsequently incorporated into a decree of divorce,
it is relevant to consider the causal connection between the changed circum-
stances and the marriage. This inquiry, however, has nothing to do with deference
to the terms of the maintenance agreement - which, and this is the key, has
already received its seal of approval by the judge granting the decree of divorce
- but everything to do with the previous order of the court.
On the other hand, where the court is requested to overlook the terms of
a maintenance agreement on an initial application for divorce, the existence
of a causal connection between changed circumstances and the marriage may
well be irrelevant to the actual dispute before the court. First, circumstances
may not have changed during the intervening period. This, for example, was
the case in Richardson, where, as Wilson 1. points out, "the same conditions"
existed at the time of the separation agreement and at the time of the divorce
proceedings: "Mrs. Richardson was unemployed and Mr. Richardson was a
sergeant in the Ottawa police force earning approximately $40,000 per
annum."ID? While undoubtedly true, this fact is simply irrelevant to the real
issueconfronting the Court of whether the original settlement was "fit and just".
To have withheld restoration of support to Mrs Richardson on the basis of the
Pelech test, therefore, was simply wrong.
Second, even where changes are not "related to a pattern of economic
dependency generated by the marriage relationship", grounds for relief may lie
on the basis of frustration. Thus, the Ontario Court of Appeal in lli?bb excused
106. Richardson, supra, note 1 at 715-716.
107. Richardson, supra,note 1 at 705.
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the husband from previously agreed on support payments after he suffered a
catastrophic and unforeseeable financial loss, which was in no way connect~d
to "a pattern of economic dependency createdby the marriage relationshijy'jes
Under the Pelech test, this decision would have been reversed.
In both instances, therefore, by asking the wrong questions, the Pelech test .
generates the wrong result.
DISCRETION UNDER THE ACT
Finally, it is necessary to reconsider the question raised at the outset as to the
proper basis for the exercise of judicial discretion under the Divorce Act to
overlook the terms of a private agreement. In this respect, two markedly divergent
positions are apparent in the Pelech trilogy, separating Wilson 1. (writing for
the majority) from La Forest 1. in singular dissent.
For Wilson J. - who interprets the dominant features of the new family law
as: "1) the importance of finality in the financial affairs of former spouses and
2) the principle of deference to the right and responsibility of individuals to
make their own decisions"109 - the exercise of the court's discretion must be
narrowly circumscribed. Apart from the Pelech test, therefore, she writes:
It seems to me that where the parties have negotiated their own agreement, freely
and on. the advice of independent legal counsel, as to how their financial affairs
should be settled on the breakdown of their marriage, and the agreement is not
unconscionable in the substantive law sense, it should be respected. People should
be encouraged to take responsibility for their own lives and their own decisions.
This should be the overriding policy consideration. I 10
Furthermore, she adds, such a policy respects "the main stream of recent
authority [emphasizing] mediation, conciliation and negotiation as the appro-
priate means of settling the affairs of spouses when the marriage relationship
dissolves","!' In this respect, therefore, the majority's deference to the terms
108. See Webb, supra, note 94.
109. Richardson, supra,note 1 at 704.
110. Pelech, supra, note 1 at 676.
l l l , Ibid. at 675.
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of a maintenance agreement corresponds to a conviction that the private sphere
of the family requires cautious legal intervention. 112
LaForest J. challenges the majority on two grounds. First, he insists, human
behaviour within the context of marriage breakdown is unlikely to accord with
the ideal vision of contractual interlocutors as rational and self-interested, which
is advanced by those who attribute efficiency and fairness to freedom of
contract.U! Thus, he writes, "many people under these circumstances do very
unwise things, things that are anything but mature and sensible, even when they
consult legal counsel'U!" It is for this reason, LaForest J. continues, that
parliament adopted an "intentionally flexible policy" in favour of judicial
discretion "to order what he or she thinks is 'fit and just' having regard to the
factors spelled out in the legislation". 115 Thus, he concludes, the majority's policy
choice in favour of freedom of contract "is effectively to rewrite the Act", both
in violation of the legitimate role of the judiciary and in direct opposition to
the intent of the legislature.116
In establishing a basis for the exercise of its discretion to overlook the terms
of a maintenance agreement, therefore, the Court appears tom between the
majority's approach of consummate deference to freedom of contract and family
privacy, and LaForest J.'s insistence on unrestricted powers of judicial discretion.
Neither solution is satisfactory. While the former consciously opts for "freedom"
112. While legal recognition of family privacy under the traditional regime - as evidenced by the
decision in Balfour, supra,notes 50-51 and accompanying text - took the form of "non-
legalization," the Court here favours informal justice and "deregulation". See Katherine
O'Donovan, "Reforming the Private: Why Can't a Man Be More like a Woman?" in Sexual
Divisions in the Law (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1985). It is interesting to note, how-
ever, the persistence of the former concept of family privacy. Thus, in Frame v. Smith (1987),
9 R.FL 225 (S.C.C.), the Supreme Court recently refused to recognize tort liability of an ex-
wife who had denied the father liberal access to the children that had been stipulated in the
court's custody order, emphasizing "the undesirability of provoking suits within the family
circle" (at 258, per LaForest J.). For provocative analyses of the intervention/nonintervention
debate, see Frances Olsen, "The Myth of State Intervention in the Family" (1985), 18 Mich. J.
Law Reform 835, and Martha Minow, "Beyond State Intervention in the Family: For Baby
Jane Doe" (1985), 18 Mich. J. Law Reform 933.
113. See supra,note 61 and accompanying text.
114. Richardson, supra,note I at 717. In Richie, supra,note 70, for example, Clements LJ.S.C.
points out that: "The courts must and do recognize that these agreements entered into upon
the breakdown of a relationship are not entered into under ideal conditions. The parties inevi-
tably are under stress, in some cases fearful, and the issues are emotionally charged. The
application of the rules of interpretation or determination of commercial contracts in their
strict sense, is not possible, on the whole in dealing with domestic contracts" (at 205-206).
See also Robert Mnookin, "Divorce Bargaining: The Limits on Private Ordering", in John M.
Eekelaar and N. Katz, eds., The Resolution ofFamily Conflict: Comparative LegalPerspectives
(Toronto: Butterworths, 1984) 364.
115. Richardson, supra,note I at 717. The affinity of this approach with that of the majority of the
Court in Messier is no accident, as LaForest 1. expressly cites Chouinard L's remarks in that
case .
. 116. Ibid. at 713.
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over "fairness'"!? and appears to entail an illegitimate exercise in judicial policy
making.r'" the latter produces no uniform standard of fairness by which"to
constrain the exercise ofjudicial discretion - thus inhibiting both equality before
the law and predictability of the law, and fostering a clirriate of frequent,costly
and time-consuming litigation that does little to benefit the parties concemed.ll~
Fortunately, there remains one final and as yet unexplored basis for the exercise
of the court'sjurisdiction to overlook the privately agreed terms of a maintenance
agreement - a basis that both provides a principled constraint on the exercise
of this discretion and accords with the animating value of gender equality
informing the transformation of family law during the past two decades. This
would require that all domestic agreements conform to a standard of substantive
fairness determined according to the principles of gender equality and equal
partnership in marriage embedded in the new family law.12°While the existence
of such a test would not (as did the traditional family law)121 seek to impose
a uniform pattern on the arrangements that spouses may wish to make upon
marriage breakdown, it would establish a minimum standard against which such
arrangements would be evaluated in determining the respect they are to be
accorded.
Of particular importance, such a criterion would recognize explicitly the
continued persistence of inequality in the social relations between men and
womenl-? - a condition that renders formal juridical equality before the law
a necessary but not sufficient condition for the attainment of actual gender
117. Pelech, supra,note 1 at 675. See supra, note 61 and accompanying text.
118. See supra,note 71 and accompanying text.
119. See supra,notes 66-67 and accompanying text.
120. Katherine O'Donovan writes: "A system of principles governing private relations is an attrac-
tive alternative to the present combination of privacy and discretion. The major principle
would be that of equality" (supra, note 112 at 202).
121. See supra, notes 52-53 and accompanying text.
122. Matas J.A. observes in Ross: "we have not yet reached the stage where we can safely say that
generally husbands and wives are equal or nearly so, in earning capacity, or where we can
necessarily say that generally the responsibilities of marriage have not disadvantaged the
earning potential of the wife" (supra, note 93 at 64).
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equality.t'-' Furthermore, it would acknowledge the impediments to fair and
informed "bargaining in the shadow of the law" during a period in which the
legal parameters defining the negotiation ofprivate agreements have experienced
such rapid change.'> Finally, while taking account of LaForest L's concerns
regarding the context in which domestic agreements are negotiated.P? the
adoption of such a standard would neither confer on the courts unconstrained
discretion to apply individual and potentially conflicting notions of fairness in
reviewing maintenance agreements nor transgress the legitimate exercise of
judicial authority by independently formulating a policy not explicitly or
implicitly contained in legislative pronouncements.tw
While LaForest 1 hints at this approach, in commenting on "the central
philosophy [of recognizing] the equal position of the spouses in the marriage
partnership" under the new family law,127 his perspective remains, in the end,
fundamentally conservative. Thus, in Caron - where support was terminated
according to the terms of a settlement agreement after Mrs Caron cohabited
with a man for longer than ninety days - LaForest 1 joins the remainder of
the Court in refusing the ex-wife's application for variation.Pf
Under the fairness test advocated here, the result should have been the opposite.
According to the new family law, as noted.P? spousal support is rehabilitative
in nature, usually of temporary duration, and based on reasonable needs arising
from a division offunctions established within the marriage and/or from enduring
consequences of the relationship (in particular, the need to care for children)
permanent maintenance is available only in the event of a traditional marriage
123. Wilson.1. would appear to dispute this statement, replying in Pelech to the comments of Matas
lA. in Ross(supra, note 122) that, although she sympathizes with his concern, she believes
"that the case by case approach and the continuing surveillance by the courts over the con-
sensual arrangements of former spouses which he advocates will ultimately reinforce the very
bias he seeks to counteract" (supra, note 1 at 675). Two responses are in order. First, Wilson
1. is addressing in this passage not the principled constraint of substantive fairness advanced
here, but rather a perceived "case by case approach" of open-ended judicial discretion.
Hence, her reaction to the standard advocated here remains in doubt. In any event, a firm
determination that judicial regulation will ultimately undermine progress toward gender
equality requires considerable empirical support, which Wilson 1. does not provide. On the
other hand, if Weitzman's data (see supra,note 12 and accompanying text) and, more gener-
any, our experience with employment law over the last century are to be of any guide, one
would do well to approach her position with considerable caution.·
. 124. See Robert M. Mnookin and Lewis Kornhauser, "Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The
Case of Divorce" (1979) 88 Yale LJ. 950.
125. See supra,notes 113-114 and accompanying text.
126. See supra, notes 66-67, 71 and accompanying text.
127. Richardson, supra,note 1 at 718.
128. While Wilson 1. (Dickson C.J.C., McIntyre, Lamer, and LeDain 11.concurring) simply defers
to the terms of the agreement, consistency with LaForest 1.'s approach in Richardson (see
supra,note 106 and accompanying text) requires that LaForest 1. defer to the original decree
of divorce incorporating the terms of the agreement: see Caron, supra, note 1 at 744.
129. Supra, notes 37-40 and accompanying text.
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oflong duration, where it would be unreasonable to expect the ex-wife to become
self-supporting.P" Only in the latter case is the decision of an ex-spouse to
cohabit with another at all relevant to this right - and there, only where a
choice is made to resume cohabitation in a relationship of economic depen-
dency.P! To conclude otherwise is to determine that the needs of the dependent
spouse and therefore the obligations of the self-reliant partner are automatically.
extinguished on the former's renewed cohabitation - a view that corresponds
to the traditional family, in which women rely on men for their upkeep, but
conflicts with the framework of individual rights and responsibilities under the
new family law.132 On this ground, the Court should have exercised its discretion·
under the Act to overlook the disputed clause in Caron and to restore support. 133
Conclusion
While the Pelech trilogy clarifies the law of support and, except for the Court's
insensitivity to the real requirements of economic rehabilitation, brings it into
conformity with the central principles of the new family law, its conclusions
with respect to domestic contracts are both confused and ultimately inconsistent
with these same principles.
The Pelech test, it is submitted, is plainly wrong. It is unfortunate that lower
courts are bound to follow it. In any event, it would appear from at least one
post-Pelech decision.P' by adhering to the verbal formula of the test, the court
may still achieve a just result. More generally, however, since the Court in Pelech
expressly refused to enter into an examination of "the substantive law" of
130. See, eg, Johnstone v. Johnstone (1985), 48 R.F.L. (2d) 30 (B.C. S.C.). ,
131. Where support payments permit an ex-spouse to engage in full-time child care, the rationale
for support remains unaffected by any subsequent cohabitation - whether or not in a rela-
tionship of economic dependency. Similarly, where an ex-spouse in receipt of "rehabilitative"
support to finance reacquisition of marketable skills cohabits "as man and wife" while par-
ticipating, for example, in a retraining program, the rationale for support persists. Even where
the ex-spouse chooses to cohabit with another in a relationship of economic dependency,
thereby rejecting the rehabilitative objective of the support payments, a free choice to this
effect should not be discouraged by the imposition of a financial penalty in the form of termi-
nation of support.
132. Note also that such a rule produces a windfall to the self-reliant spouse who is thereby
relieved from support obligations.
133. It is difficult to imagine that the Court could have determined that a reasonable period of
time had elapsed to justify termination of support payments independently of the settlement
agreement - particularly given its admittedly limited knowledge as to the specific work pat-
tern and skills of the appellant. See Caron, supra,note 1 at 743.
134. See Isaacson v. Issacson (1987),10 R.F.L. (3d) 121 (B.C. S.C.), where an agreement for tem-
porary spousal support was predicated on the mistaken assumption that the wife's retraining
course concluded six months sooner than was actually the case. Theparties' mutual mistake
was said to give rise to "a changed circumstance, and a changed circumstance to which there
is a causal connection with the former marriage" (at 127).
I
l
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contract, lower courts presumably retain their freedom to apply "all of the
common law and equitable defenses to the enforcement of ordinary contracts"
that Zuber lA. mentioned in Farquar. Characterized as such, rather than as
an exercise of discretion under the Divorce Act, a court will be able to employ
the doctrines of frustration and unconscionability to arrive at results identical
to those in Ross and Webb - each of which is criticized by Wilson J. in Pelech.
On the other hand, by adopting an over-riding policy of deference to the terms
of such agreements, the Court appears to have forestalled for now the
development of a general standard offairness to govern judicial discretion under
the Act. I35 In so doing, the Court is sending out a strong message against public
regulation of the content of domestic contracts. Given the inequality in existing
social relations between men and women, this decision is unfortunate. Respect
for privacy in this context is resignation to the persistence of inequality.
DAVID G. DUFF
135. While it might be argued that ordinary principles of contract law, recognizing nonperfor-
mance on the grounds of public policy generally, afford an opportunity to import this stan-
dard in spite of the Court's decision, this would go against the majority's clear statement that
freedom of contract should be "the overriding policy consideration".
